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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS COURT MUST REVIEW THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
INTERPRETATION OF THE TERMS OF THE EARNEST MONEY SALES 
AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO ADDRESS THE PROPRIETY OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO KNIGHTON. 
One of the issues presented by this appeal is the propriety of 
the District Court's award of $8,845.50 in attorney's fees to 
defendant Knighton. Such award was premised upon and entered 
pursuant to the terms of the parties' Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
in accordance with the Court's finding that (1) time did not become 
of the essence until fifteen days after the scheduled date of 
closing; and (2) the delays in closing were due to the Lotts rather 
than Knighton and Marsh. In order to determine the propriety of 
the District Court's award of fees, this Court must address the 
provisions of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement under which such 
fees are claimed, and determine which party in fact breached the 
Agreement. Consequently, Knighton's attempt to argue that this 
Court should essentially ignore the provisions of the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement is senseless. 
Paragraph N of the parties' Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
provides for an award of attorney's fees: 
1 
Both parties agree that should either party default in 
any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the 
defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or 
accrue from enforcing or terminating this 
Agreement . . . . 
By the plain language of this Paragraph, a necessary 
prerequisite to any award of attorney's fees is a finding as to 
which party breached the terms of the Agreement. Here, the 
District Court found, in clear contravention of the substantial 
issues of disputed fact, that the Lotts breached the Agreement. To 
do so, the District Court was required both to interpret the time 
is of the essence provision of the Agreement and to address the 
factual issues presented by each party's performance. On appeal, 
then, this Court must consider the District Court's findings before 
it can determine whether or not the attorney's fee award was 
proper. 
This Court's decision in Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P. 2d 834 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), cited by appellees at page 16 of their Reply 
Brief, is supportive of the Lotts' position. The Cobabe Court held 
that, where the sales contract in dispute awarded attorney's fees 
to the "successful party," the appellate court's role is to 
determine whether the trial court erred by finding that there was 
no prevailing party. Id. at 83 6. To review the trial court's 
decision, this Court necessarily had to consider the issue of which 
party prevailed under the contract. 
2 
Here, the Lotts merely ask this Court to follow the precedent 
of Cobabe and determine the propriety of the District Court's award 
of attorney's fees by the only means possible: determining 
entitlement to such fees under the Agreement by resolving the issue 
of which party in fact breached the terms of the Agreement. This 
does not amount to "rearguing the merits," as claimed by Knighton 
and Marsh; rather, it is the only possible means by which this 
Court may address the issues presented for appeal. 
II. 
KNIGHTON AND MARSH ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BREACH OF THE 
EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT, REGARDLESS OF THE 
INTERPRETATION OF THE TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE CLAUSE. 
The crucial fact presented by this appeal is that the subject 
sale was required to close on May 1, 1994, but the Lotts did not 
receive the Note and Trust Deed necessary to close such sale until 
June 9, 1994. Regardless of the interpretation of the time is of 
the essence clause, then, someone breached the Agreement. For the 
District Court to have held that the Lotts breached the Agreement, 
in light of the substantial issues of disputed fact which were 
presented, is perplexing at best. 
Despite the plain language of paragraph Q of the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement, which provides that extensions of the May 1, 1994, 
closing date are to be granted only upon certain types of 
extraordinary occurrences which are not at issue here, the District 
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Court found that time did not become of the essence until fifteen 
days after the designated closing date. As fully set forth in the 
Lotts' Opening Brief, the District Court's finding is in clear 
contravention of the express contractual language and prevailing 
principles of contractual interpretation.1 Furthermore, the case 
relied upon by Knighton and Marsh in support of their 
interpretation, Krantz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352 (Utah 1991), does not 
constitute binding authority because the issue of the 
enforceability of the time is of the essence clause was not even 
presented to the Supreme Court by the parties. 
However, assuming arguendo, that the District Court's 
interpretation was in fact correct, and the time is of the essence 
clause did not take effect until May 16, 1994, fifteen days after 
the scheduled closing, Knighton was still was in default. Knighton 
and Marsh attempt to obfuscate their failure to perform by claiming 
that the Lotts were in breach because they did not designate the 
location of the closing or obtain a title report2. As the closing 
1
 Utah courts have held that time is of the essence clauses 
will be enforced where performance is untimely or nonexistent 
Barber v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah Ct.App. 1987), and that 
ambiguities should be construed against the party responsible for 
drafting of the Agreement (here, Knighton and Marsh) Matter of 
Orris' Estate, 622 P.2d 337 (Utah 1980). 
2
 Knighton also asserts that the Lotts were not in a position 
to convey title because the property was in fact titled in Zions 
First National Bank. However, as the closing agent, Marsh should 
have discovered the defect, as he was obligated to obtain title 
4 
agent, however, Marsh was responsible for both of these tasks. 
What Knighton and Marsh fail to mention, and what makes the 
District Court's decision so puzzling, is the fact that, clearly, 
one party was in default as evidenced by the fact that closing was 
set to occur on May 1, 1994, or, even under the District Court's 
interpretation, by May 16. However, the Lotts did not receive the 
Trust Deed and Note necessary for closing until June 9, 1994. This 
delay was due solely to Knighton and Marsh. The Lotts requested 
minor changes in the Trust Deed on May 16. In light of his own 
delay, Knighton's assertion that he did "everything required of him 
to close the transaction by April 29, 1994" is flatly erroneous. 
(See Appellee's Brief, p. 28) . Knighton failed to tender 
performance within either interpretation of the time is of the 
essence clause and was in clear breach of the Agreement. The 
District Court's grant of summary judgment upon these facts is 
clearly unsupported. Consequently, any award of attorney's fees to 
Knighton cannot be sustained. 
insurance, and did obtain a Deed to cure the defect in title 
shortly after the discovery of such defect. (See Exhibit H to the 
Lotts' opening brief). 
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III. 
THE MERGER DOCTRINE EXPRESSLY PRECLUDES ANY AWARD OF FEES 
ON APPEAL TO KNIGHTON. 
There is no basis for an award of fees on appeal to Knighton; 
consequently, such an award must be denied. The only potential 
basis for such an award is the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, the 
terms of which were extinguished upon the Lotts' court-ordered 
delivery of the Warranty Deed to Knighton under the merger 
doctrine. This case does not present an exception to the merger 
doctrine, nor is there any other basis for such an award, as 
Knighton argues. 
As fully set forth in the Lotts' opening Brief, the delivery 
and acceptance of a Warranty Deed extinguishes the terms of a 
previous contract for the sale of land. Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 
790, 792 (Utah 1986). This principle, which was recently 
reiterated by this Court, Maynard v. Wharton, 912 P.2d 446 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1996), applies with equal force to an attorney's fees 
clause contained in an Earnest Money Sales Agreement. Espinoza v. 
Safeco Title Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 346, 348 (Utah 1979). Here, 
Paragraph 0 of the parties' Earnest Money Sales Agreement contained 
an express abrogation clause. Consequently, the attorney's fee 
provision of the Agreement was extinguished by the Lotts' delivery 
of the Warranty Deed, and its provisions are no longer valid. 
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Nor has Knighton identified any other basis for an award of 
fees on appeal. Knighton attempts to argue that the "collateral" 
exception to the merger doctrine applies; specifically, that the 
Lotts have a "collateral" obligation to pay attorney's fees to 
Knighton in an action by Knighton to compel them to convey title, 
including fees incurred to defend a resulting judgment. 
The collateral exception was set forth by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). However, in Leventis, the court found that the collateral 
exception applied because the parties had clearly entered into an 
express agreement collateral to the conveyance of real property: 
specifically, the seller would remove certain equipment from the 
building. Id. at 844. 
Here, there was no such express agreement. The Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement contained an standard attorney's fee provision with 
an abrogation clause. The Agreement presents a textbook case for 
application of the merger doctrine. Nor are the remaining cases 
cited by Knighton of any assistance. Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P. 2d 
622 (Utah 1985) and Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P. 2d 834 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) . In neither case is the application of the merger doctrine 
at issue. 
Furthermore, Knighton has provided absolutely no support for 
his attempt to rely upon Rule 3 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
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Procedure as a basis for an award of fees on appeal. This Court 
has held that such sanctions are to be applied only in egregious 
cases, to avoid chilling the right to appeal. Porco v. Porco, 752 
P.2d 356 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). "Frivolous" appeals have been 
defined as those lacking in any reasonable legal or factual basis, 
Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct.App. 1989), such as 
mischaracterization and misstatement of evidence and law. Eames v. 
Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah 1987). Here, the Lotts have presented an 
extensive chronology of disputed facts, in light of which the 
District Court's decision compels review, as well as significant 
issues of law regarding the interpretation of the time is of the 
essence" clause. Consequently, there is no basis for an award of 
fees under Rule 33, nor has Knighton identified any specific 
justification in support of such award. 
CONCLUSION 
Knighton and Marsh's argument fails to realize that, in order 
to consider the issues presented by this appeal, namely, the 
recoverability of attorney's fees, this Court must determine (1) 
the proper interpretation of the "time is of the essence" clause; 
and (2) which party breached the Earnest Money Sales Agreement by 
failing to tender performance. It is simply illogical to argue, as 
do Knighton and Marsh, that the propriety of the attorney's fee 
award can be considered absent such determination. 
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Furthermore, an analysis of the disputed facts demonstrates 
that the District Court erred by finding that the Lotts were the 
breaching party. Knighton failed to tender the Trust Deed and Note 
until well after the expiration of the time is of the essence 
clause, even under the District Court's interpretation. Knighton 
has advanced absolutely no justification for his failure to timely 
tender performance. Knighton attempts to shift the blame to the 
Lotts for failure to perform acts which in fact were Marsh's 
responsibility in order to obfuscate the fact of his non-
performance. 
Finally, there is absolutely no basis for an award of 
attorney's fees on appeal. In fact, the merger doctrine expressly 
prohibits such award. Knighton has advanced no argument sufficient 
to overcome the application of the merger doctrine; the collateral 
exception does not apply, as the parties entered no collateral 
agreement. Nor has Knighton suggested any justification for an 
award of fees under U.R.A.P. 33. 
Consequently, the Lotts request that: (1) should this Court 
find that the time is of the essence clause took effect on May 1, 
1994, this case be remanded to determine the issue of attorney's 
fees to the Lotts; or, in the alternative, should this Court find 
that the clause took effect on May 16, 1994, then the fee award 
should be reversed and the case remanded to determine which party 
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breached; and (2) Knighton and Marsh's claim for fees on appeal 
should be denied. 
DATED: January 13, 1997. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
v. <%^. 
MARK A. LARSEN 
KRISTINE EDDE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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